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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the impact of the new Basel Capital Accords (Basel 
II and Basel III) on the bank’s capital requirements in a portfolio of Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) when the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach is used. To do this, the study uses a large database of Spanish 
firms and covers the period from 2005 to 2009. 
We also examine the effect on the credit risk premium charged by 
banks of the guarantee offered by a Loan Guarantee Association (LGA) to a 
SME; and whether this foreseeable decrease in the interest rates applicable 
to the SME is compensated by the cost of this guarantee.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2010 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) agreed 
new international banking guidelines as a response to the financial crisis of 
2008.2 This new Accord, known as Basel III, tries to achieve financial 
stability and strengthen the solvency of banks and liquidity without 
diminishing the flow of money from the credit market. The new framework 
also aims to improve risk management and governance as well as 
strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures, learning from the financial 
crisis. However, unlike Basel II (2004), Basel III does not imply a major 
change in the previous Capital Accord but rather they complement each 
other; it simplifies and strengthens the numerator of the capital ratio and 
introduces some macroprudential components to the regulatory framework. 
Among the main elements proposed by Basel III are the following: first, it 
substantially raises the quality and quantity of capital, with a greater focus 
on common equity.3 Capital needs to be of the highest quality to better 
absorb losses from shocks that could emanate from anywhere; second, 
Basel III also introduces a simple leverage ratio, which will act as a 
                                                          
2 The Basel Committee's oversight body - the Group of Central Bank Governors and 
Heads of Supervision (GHOS) - agreed on the broad framework of Basel III in 
September 2009 and the Committee set out concrete proposals in December 2009. 
These consultative documents formed the basis of the Committee's response to the 
financial crisis and are part of the global initiatives to strengthen the financial 
regulatory system that have been endorsed by the G20 Leaders. The GHOS 
subsequently agreed on key design elements of the reform package at its July 2010 
meeting and on the calibration and transition to implement the measures at its 
September 2010 meeting. 
3 The minimum Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 requirements will be phased in 
between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015. On 1 January 2013, the minimum 
Common Equity Tier 1 requirement will rise from the current 2% level to 3.5%. The 
Tier 1 capital requirement will rise from 4% to 4.5%. On 1 January 2014, banks will 
have to meet a 4% minimum Common Equity Tier 1 requirement and a Tier 1 
requirement of 5.5%. On 1 January 2015, banks will have to meet the 4.5% 
Common Equity Tier 1 and the 6% Tier 1 requirements. The total capital 
requirement remains at the existing level of 8.0% and so does not need to be 
phased in. 
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backstop to the risk-based measure. Such a measure is critical to 
underpinning the whole regime and will provide a simple, easy to 
understand sanity check of the results produced by the risk-based 
framework. A third dimension of Basel III is the use of capital buffers. The 
conservation buffer provides a strong incentive for banks to build up capital 
in good times while the countercyclical buffer should help protect banks 
against the dangers of rapid credit growth.4 Finally, sound liquidity risk 
management principles and global liquidity standards will help ensure that 
banks more effectively manage this risk and maintain adequate liquidity 
buffers.  
Regarding the impact on financial aspects of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), the importance of SMEs for the BCBS is evident from 
the various modifications that were made with the object that the new 
banking regulation established in Basel II should not turn out to be too 
detrimental for these companies in terms of the capital required.5,6 
However, because of Basel II Accord sets up capital requirements that are 
more sensitive to risk, it increases the risk premium that the banks charge 
on SMEs and, as a result, it exacerbates their very well-known financial 
difficulties (Cardone-Riportella and Trujillo-Ponce, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
new banking regulation allows companies to make use of collateral, 
                                                          
4 A capital conservation buffer of 2.5%, comprised of Common Equity Tier 1, is 
established above the regulatory minimum capital requirement. The capital 
conservation buffer will be phased in between 1 January 2016 and year end 2018 
becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019. It will begin at 0.625% of RWAs on 1 
January 2016 and increase each subsequent year by an additional 0.625 
percentage points, to reach its final level of 2.5% of RWAs on 1 January 2019. 
5 The formulas for calculating the regulatory capital associated with SMEs were 
modified three times (in the Basel II consultative documents of 2001, 2003, and 
2004). 
6 Under the Basel Capital Accords, an SME is understood as a company where the 
reported sales for the consolidated group of which the firm is a part is less than €50 
million. 
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guarantees and credit derivatives, on-balance sheet netting, mortgages, 
etc. to mitigate credit risk. It is, therefore, interesting for banks to know the 
impact of such techniques on their capital requirements, as this could mean 
that some types of credit-risk mitigation techniques are more advisable 
than others. 
In this sense, our paper emphasises the impact on the bank’s capital of 
the guarantee provided by the Loan Guarantee Associations (LGAs). We 
examine the effects of this guarantee on the credit risk premium that banks 
had to charge to their SME clients, and whether this foreseeable theoretical 
reduction in the interest rates is compensated by the cost of the guarantee 
requested. It is well known that in order to reduce the problems derived 
from information asymmetries, there are entities all over the world that 
mediate with banks to give guarantees supporting the operations of SMEs. 
The LGAs act as guarantors of SMEs in dealings with banks, with the object 
of reducing risks for banks by providing loans to small and medium-sized 
companies. This support helps small companies get financing under better 
conditions in terms of rate, credit amount, term, and guarantee (Camino 
and Cardone, 1999; IDEA, 2003). In parallel, many countries, with the aim 
of offering sufficient cover and guarantee for the risks contracted by the 
LGAs and facilitate the reduction of the cost of the guarantee for their 
partners, use reinsurance systems. Their objective is to provide a second, 
or a backup guarantee, for the operations guaranteed by an LGA. In Spain, 
the Spanish Reinsurance Company (CERSA), provides a second guarantee 
to banks.  
The main objectives of this paper are: i) first, to analyse the impact of 
the new banking regulation (Basel Capital Accords, II and III) on the bank’s 
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capital requirements for loans to SMEs, considered either as retail or 
corporate, when the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach is used; and ii) 
second, to study the impact on this capital requirement (and hence on the 
credit risk premium) when the SME access to the credit market guaranteed 
by an LGA.7 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
research literature. Section 3 develops a model to predict one-year SME 
default for the Spanish firms and derives capital requirements for banks 
under the new banking regulation when IRB approach is used. Section 4 
analyses how the guarantee granted by an LGA to an SME influences the 
bank’s capital requirements. Section 5 conducts an analysis about the 
impact of the LGA guarantees on the credit risk premium and, ultimately, 
on the interest rates applicable to SMEs and compares it with the cost of the 
LGA guarantee. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Review of research literature 
There are several studies in the literature analysing the impact on the 
capital requirements of the banks of the financing of SMEs. Altman and 
Sabato (2005) examine the effects of Basel II on capital requirements of 
banks using data from the USA, Italy, and Australia. They conclude that 
banks would have significant profits even with lower capital requirements, 
when considering SMEs as retail customers, provided that IRB approach is 
applied. However, for SMEs treated as corporate entities, the capital 
requirements are considered to be slightly greater than those considered as 
retail entities. This leads to the assumption, in their opinion, that most 
                                                          
7 Loans extended to SMEs are eligible for retail treatment provided the total 
exposure of the banking group to a small business borrower (on a consolidated 
 6
banks would apply both systems simultaneously; i.e., they would consider 
one part of the loans granted to SMEs as corporate entities and the rest as 
retail entities. Through a breakeven analysis, they observed that banks 
would be obliged to classify at least 20% of their SMEs portfolio as retail 
entities to maintain the current capital requirement8. According to Berger 
(2006), the adoption of the advanced internal ratings-based (A-IRB) 
approach by large credit entities in the USA, may not signify a reduction in 
the interest rates applied to loans granted to SMEs, but may be enough to 
produce a substitution effect with respect to other credit entities that are 
smaller. Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008) find that big, high-quality 
banks, which are expected to adopt the IRB approach, will tend to serve the 
less risky customers while small banks, which are expected to adopt the 
standardised approach, will tend to serve the riskier customers and, thus, 
become riskier themselves. Other remarkable studies that have considered 
Basel II Accord are: Schwaiger (2002), for the Austrian economy; Scellato, 
G. and Ughetto, E., (2010), for the Italian market; Blum (2008), Decamps 
et al. (2004), Dietsch and Petey (2004), Johnston (2009), Kerkhof and 
Melenberg (2004), Lindquist (2004), Medema et al. (2009) and Repullo and 
Suárez (2004), and Berger and Udell (2004) and Berger (2006) for the US 
market, among others. 
In Spain, Saurina and Trucharte (2004) use information from the 
Spanish Credit Register (“from the offer side” of the credit market), and 
estimate capital requirements taking aggregate average of probability of 
default (PDs) for SMEs (sales below €50M) and large firms (sales above 
                                                                                                                                                                          
basis where applicable) is less than €1 million. 
8 In Altman and Sabato (2007) they also find a distress prediction model specifically 
for the SME sector. 
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€50M) for the period 1994 to 2001. They analyse the consultative 
documents issued prior to the approval of the Basel II Accord, focusing their 
analysis on SMEs and their repercussions on banks financing Spanish 
companies. They observe that the modifications made in 2002, considered 
part of the financing of SMEs either as retail or corporate entities. Moreover, 
they also observed that adjustments made for size in the PD curve 
depending on the category. This substantially improved the capital 
requirement figures required which were reduced on average to 6.5% for 
the IRB approach, and 6% for the Standardised approach for SMEs included 
in the retail category. The rest of the SMEs included in the corporate 
category, also saw that the capital requirements were reduced to 10.23% 
and 8% for the IRB and Standardised approaches respectively. Thus, they 
conclude that at least at the level of the Spanish credit system as a whole, 
there were no incentives for a change in the current pattern of bank 
financing provided to corporate entities. Although, the final effect will 
depend again on the percentage of financing provided to SMEs considered 
as retail entities. It is worth stressing that these results did not take into 
consideration the latest modifications prior to the definitive approval of the 
agreement. Finally, Cardone-Riportella and Trujillo-Ponce (2007) conduct a 
scenario analysis to consider the impact of the guarantees given to Spanish 
SMEs in relation to the capital requirements demanded by Basel II. 
Our paper contributes to previous empirical literature by using a large 
sample of firms extracted from the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances 
Ibéricos) database, with information “from the demand-side” of the credit 
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market.9 We also consider a relevant period, from 2005 to 2009, which 
takes into consideration the deep economic crisis after 2007 in Spain. And 
finally, we include in the analysis, for the first time, the new capital 
requirements proposed in the Basel III Accord. 
3. Bank capital requirements for SMEs 
Under the new banking regulation, the way an SME is treated will differ 
according to the approach chosen by the particular bank, Standardised or 
IRB, and according to whether the bank includes the SME in the corporate 
or retail category. In the Standardised approach, banks must classify their 
exposures to risk according to various groups, and establish weights based 
on the credit rating given to the SME by an external credit assessment 
institution.10 On the other hand, the IRB approach is based on the internal 
estimations made by the bank, which allow the bank to calculate capital 
requirements that are more sensitive to the risk. Under the foundation 
approach (F-IRB), banks provide their own estimates of probability of 
default (PD) and rely on the supervisory estimates for other risk 
components: the loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD), 
and the effective maturity of the operation (M). Under the advanced 
approach (A-IRB), banks provide more of their own estimates of PD, LGD, 
EAD, and their own calculation of M, subject to meeting minimum 
standards. For both the foundation and advanced approaches, banks must 
                                                          
9 The SABI database is compiled by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. See 
http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/National/SABI.aspx for a 
more detailed description of the database. 
10 The Basel Accords leave it to the discretion of the national supervisor to allow 
banks to risk-weight all corporate claims at 100%, without regarding the external 
ratings. SMEs included in a regulatory retail portfolio may be risk-weighted at 75%, 
except for the past due loans. 
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always use the risk-weight functions provided in Basel Accords for the 
purpose of deriving capital requirements (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
Therefore, the estimation of the PD is a key aspect of the new banking 
regulation. It must be a long-run average of 1-year default rates for 
borrowers in the grade. The length of the underlying historical observation 
period used must be at least 5 years, and the bank is permitted to apply for 
its calculation by one or more of the following techniques: i) internal default 
experience; ii) mapping to external data; or iii) statistical default models. 
3.1. A model of default for Spanish SMEs 
In this section, we develop a specific model to estimate one-year SME 
probability of default for Spanish firms. To do this, we use data from the 
SABI database, which contains accounting and financial information for the 
majority of Spanish SMEs. We consider firms with sales below €50M that 
defaulted in the period 2005 to 2009.11 The final sample (defaulted and 
active firms) is obtained using a methodology similar to the used by Altman 
and Sabato (2007), which consider for each year of the sample a ratio of 
defaulted to total firms equal to a prior probability of default. In our paper, 
we use the PD reported previously by Saurina and Trucharte (2004) for 
Spanish SMEs (3.07%, for the 1994-2001 period). However, because of the 
economic crisis, we adjust PD estimations for years 2008 and 2009 (“crisis” 
period years) following bankruptcy rates evolution from Spanish National 
Statistics Institute (INE) data12. The average PD on data from INE for years 
2005-2007 is 0.0325%. In 2008 the PD increased on 78.16% from this 
                                                          
11 Default is defined following the Spanish Bankruptcy Regime (Law 22/2003, 
modified by Royal Decree Law 3/2009).An overview of this regime can be found in 
Celentani et al. (2010). 
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average, and in 2009 the PD was 146.07% greater than the 2005-2007 
average. Considering these calculations, for year 2008 (first year of 
economic crisis) we assume a PD of 5.47% (3.07% x 1.78), and for year 
2009 a PD of 7.55% (3.07% x 2.46). Table 1 shows the conformation of the 
final sample, based on data from SABI.13 The second column shows the 
defaulted firms for each year, while the third column shows active firms 
(that have not defaulted since the corresponding year up to 2010). The 
number of active firms was randomly selected to obtain a ratio of defaulted 
to total firms equal to the prior one-year PD. The 2005-2009 average PD of 
the sample is 5.28%. 
After selecting the sample of firms, we have to choose a set of 
explanatory variables that will help us to predict the PD for each rating 
class. Based on previous studies (Altman and Sabato, 2005; 2007), we 
analyze 24 financial ratios for the year prior to default in addition to firm 
age and time dummy variables, including interaction terms (see Table 
2)1415. Using a stepwise variable selection, based on goodness of fit, 
percentage of correct predictions, and stability of the results, the logistic 
equation is as follows:16 
                                                                                                                                                                          
12 INE data accounts for small and large firms. Unfortunately, we could not obtain 
bankruptcy data discriminated by sales volume for the interval €5-50 millions.  
13
 We exclude firms with different legal forms from Corporations to Limited Liability 
Companies. Other legal forms include cooperatives and civil societies, which are 
non-profit organizations that probably are not comparable to profit-seeking firms, 
for example regarding profitability ratios. 
14 We included interaction terms in the form of Dummy year x Explanatory Variable 
for each year of the sample. This methodology allows us to test if the determinants 
of default differ through the different years of the economic cycle.  
15 Financial literature concludes that including qualitative variables improves the 
models’ prediction power. Despite this, we are obliged to use only firms’ financial 
statement data since the SABI database does not contain qualitative variables. 
16 A weighted logistic regression is used to estimate PDs. The weight assigned to 
each firm corresponds to N/Ni where N is the total size of the sample and Ni is the 
sub-sample size for defaulted and non defaulted firms. This model has a higher 
percentage of correctly predicted defaults than the traditional unweighted logit 
regression. 
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Where 
,i tZ is the log odds of the dependent variable for the i
th case in 
the tth period, b0 is a constant and the ‘‘b” terms are the logistic regression 
coefficients. All the ratios used as independent variables enter into the 
regression equation staggered by one period, because we want to predict 
one year PDs. The final model contains 12 variables: 1 size variables, 2 
profitability variables, 1 leverage variable, 1 liquidity variables, 1 growth 
variable, 2 activity variables, 2 time variables, and 2 interaction terms (see 
Table 3). We observe that only the dummy variables for the crisis years are 
relevant (2008 and 2009). The interaction terms are relevant only for year 
2009, when they interact with of financial results to Total Debt (FRTD) and 
Tangible Assets to Total Assets (TanTA). We see that the negative effect of 
FRTD and TanTA on the probability of default decreases in magnitude for 
year 2009. 
To describe the relationship between Zi and the probability of entering 
in default state ( ipi ) for the i
th case we use the following link function: 
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The model correctly predicts 85% of defaults and 83% of non-
defaults17.  
3.2. Deriving Bank Capital Requirements  
In order to compute the formulas to estimate bank capital 
requirements under the IRB approach we make the following general 
assumptions: 
- Expected one-year PDs are computed through a logit model (see 
Section 3.1 for a detailed discussion).  
- We use a fixed LGD of 45% (percentage suggested in the F-IRB 
approach for senior, unsecured loan exposures). 
- We rank the firms by their expected PDs, and then compute the 
number of defaults by the number of firms in each group (observed 
PDs). Rating classes are created to obtain the value of PD closest to 
the one showed by bond equivalent PD distributions18. Note that PDs 
and weights vary from SMEs as retail vs. SMEs as corporate. 
- The percentage of firms in each rating class is used as weight for the 
capital requirement.  
- For a detail of all the formulas used in calculations see Table A.1. 
 
In addition, we make some specific assumptions depending on whether 
SMEs are considered as retail or as corporate.  
3.2.1. SMEs considered as retail (Table 4) 
                                                          
17 The accuracy of this model lies within the misclassification rates reported by 
Altman and Sabato (2007). 
18 Source: 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=124520720111
9 
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The logit model creates 7 rating classes when considering all SMEs as 
retail. See Table A.2 for details. 
 
3.2.2. SMEs considered as corporate (Tables 5 and 6): 
- The sample is divided into two groups: small firms (sales between €5 
and 25 million) and medium-sized firms (sales between €25.01 and 
50 million).19 The sample contains 84.8% small firms and 15.2% 
medium-sized firms.  
- The logit model creates 7 rating classes for small firms, and 6 rating 
classes for medium-sized firms (see Tables A.3 and A.4 for details).20 
With this classification we obtain a weighted average PD of 5.26% for 
small firms and 4.49% for medium-sized firms. As expected, smaller 
firms are riskier.  
- We select possible maturities of three years for smaller firms and five 
years for medium-sized firms. 
- The maturity adjustment is a function only of PD. 
- For size adjustment we use the sample average amount of sales for 
each group: €12.1 (Small-sized-firms) and €33.4 million (Medium-
sized firms).  
 
Under Basel II, for SMEs classified as retail, the bank capital 
requirements are 3.926%. If SMEs are considered as corporate, using as 
weights the participation of each size-group in the sample, the bank capital 
                                                          
19 Under the IRB approach, for the purposes of the firm-size adjustment for SME borrowers, companies with sales of less than 
€5 million are treated as if they were equivalent to €5 million.
 
20 In this sense we depart from previous works (Altman and Sabato, 2005 and 
2007), which consider the same rating classes and PDs for SMEs treated as retail or 
corporate. 
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requirements result of 7.36% (0.848 x 7.054% + 0.152 x 9.063%). With 
the new banking rules agreed in 2010 (Basel III) these requirements rise up 
to 5.152% when the SMEs are considered as retail and up to 9.66% 
(0.848*9.259% + 0.152*11.895%) if banks classify their SME portfolio as 
corporate. As we expected, our results show that banks will face higher 
capital requirements with Basel III Accord than under the previous ones. 
4. Credit-risk mitigation in the new banking regulation: The case of 
the LGA 
Banks use a number of techniques to mitigate the credit risks to which 
they are exposed. For example, exposures may be collateralised by first-
priority claims (in whole or in part with cash or securities), guaranteed by a 
third party, or a bank may buy a credit derivative to offset various forms of 
credit risk. Additionally, banks may agree to net loans owed to them against 
deposits from the same counterparty. The effect of this reduction of risk is 
that lower requirements of capital requirements are imposed under Basel II 
and III Accords. Now the next question is whether all the types of 
guarantee offered by the borrower have equal capacity to reduce the risk 
for the banks (Vargas, 2001). The specific treatment given to each of the 
various types of credit-risk mitigation techniques, and hence, to the eligible 
assets or guarantors may differ according to the approach employed by the 
bank (standardised, F-IRB, and A-IRB), although there are features 
common to all the three of them.  
Related to the guarantees, a range of guarantors and protection 
providers are recognised, and a substitution approach is applied. Thus, only 
guarantees issued by entities with a lower risk weight than the counterparty 
will lead to reduced capital charges, since the protected portion of the 
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counterparty exposure is assigned the risk weight of the guarantor or 
protection provider, whereas the uncovered portion retains the risk weight 
of the underlying counterparty. It is in this context that the guarantee 
awarded by an LGA becomes important. The new banking regulation allows 
the effect of this cover to be taken into account, although both the 
guarantee and the LGA must meet a series of requirements for a reduction 
in the CR to be obtained. 21 
The treatment of the guarantee provided by an LGA in the IRB 
approach differs depending on whether the banks utilise the values provided 
by the supervisors for the loss in the event of default or LGD (foundation 
IRB), or employ their own internal estimations (advanced IRB). Under either 
of the approaches, credit risk mitigation in the form of guarantees must not 
reflect the effect of double default. Thus, if the bank recognises the 
guarantee, the adjusted risk-weight must not be less than that of a 
comparable direct exposure to the guarantor, in this case, the LGA. 
4.1. Foundation IRB 
The banks that utilise the F-IRB approach for calculating their 
regulatory capital recognise the guarantees provided by the LGA in the 
following way. They derive the risk-weighting from the covered portion of 
the loan utilising the risk-weighting function appropriate for the LGA and the 
PD corresponding to the LGA or any intermediate rating between that of the 
SME and LGA, if the bank deems a full substitution treatment not to be 
warranted. In addition, the bank may replace the LGD of the underlying 
transaction with the LGD applicable to the guarantee, taking into account 
                                                          
21 The importance of the guarantee in financing appears to be strengthened under 
the new banking regulation. The capital requirements are generally lower than for 
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the seniority and any collateralisation of a guaranteed commitment. The 
risk-weighting and the LGD associated with the SME will be assigned to the 
part not covered by the guarantee. At the same time, any mismatch 
between the term of the operation and the duration of the guarantee will be 
taken into consideration. 
4.2. Advanced IRB 
Banks using the advanced approach for estimating LGDs may reflect 
the risk-mitigating effect of guarantees through either adjusting PD (the 
same treatment outlined previously for banks under the F-IRB approach) or 
LGD estimates.22 However, in contrast to the foundation approach, 
guarantees prescribing conditions under which the guarantor may not be 
obliged to perform (conditional guarantees) may be recognised under 
certain conditions. 
4.3. Retail Exposures 
The treatment proposed under new banking regulation for mitigating 
retail risks in the event of guarantees is very similar to that proposed for 
those banks that choose to make their own estimations of the LGD. Banks 
may reflect the risk-reducing effects of guarantees, either in support of an 
individual obligation or a pool of exposures, through an adjustment of either 
the PD or LGD estimate, if a series of minimum requirements are met and 
with the prior approval of the competent authorities. There are no 
restrictions on the types of eligible guarantors, if they meet the conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                          
those collateralised by some type of asset, by mortgage or otherwise. 
22 The criteria for adjustment must be clear, plausible, and intuitive, and must address the 
LGA’s ability and willingness to perform under the guarantee. The criteria must also address 
the likely timing of any payments and the degree to which the LGA’s ability to perform under 
the guarantee is correlated with the borrower’s ability to repay. The bank’s criteria must also 
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established by the regulation, which are the same as under the advanced 
IRB approach. 
 
4.4. Reinsurance systems 
In Europe, rather more than half of the guarantee systems (56%) have 
some kind of counter-guarantee, although in most cases this does not cover 
100% of the operation.23 However, it is clear that the backup guarantee 
represents a significant support to the creditworthiness of the LGA, and this 
fact is even recognised by the Spanish regulations. In particular, it is 
recognised that, when a series of conditions are met, reinsurance is an 
instrument that reduces the credit risk, and consequently should lead to a 
reduction of the own resources (of the LGA) required with respect to those 
commitments that benefit from general contracts of second guarantees or 
reinsurance. This signifies that the counter-guarantee constitutes a variable 
to be considered when the bank estimates the PD or LGD applicable under 
the IRB approach, except where the national legislation stipulates to the 
contrary. Thus, those SMEs endorsed by an LGA whose guarantees are 
indirectly counter-guaranteed to a significant percentage by any reinsurance 
company should benefit from the lower capital requirements by the lender 
bank. 
5. Analysis and Results 
                                                                                                                                                                          
consider the extent to which residual risk to the borrower remains, for example, a currency 
mismatch between the guarantee and the underlying exposure. 
23 The Spanish reinsurance company (CERSA) provides backup guarantees for the 
financial operations underwritten by the LGAs, to different percentages of cover 
according to the type of operation. The cover for operations ranges from 30% to 
75%; new company operations and those of innovative character enjoy more cover. 
The contracts establish a maximum cost of the cover calculated in function of a Q 
quality rate in the management of the risk. 
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After deriving the capital requirements with the new banking rules (see 
Tables 4 to 6), we measure the credit risk premium that banks should 
charge on loans to SMEs, guaranteed or not by an LGA. Following Martín 
and Trujillo (2004), and Liebig et al. (2007), among others, we determine 
the credit risk premium for commercial loans as the sum of two 
components: the expected loss (EL) and the opportunity cost of the 
regulatory capital.24,25 EL represents an average value of the expected 
losses owing to credit risk in 1 year from an economic perspective. It is 
estimated as the product of three variables already known: EAD, PD, and 
LGD. Banks view EL as a cost component of doing business, and manage 
them by a number of means, including through the pricing of credit 
exposures and provisioning. With respect to this, the amount imputable to 
the borrower in terms of “foreseen loss,” as a percentage of the exposure to 
the risk, would be equal to PD × LGD. On the other hand, the bank must 
also consider the possibility of a "not expected loss" or unexpected loss 
(UL), derived from the volatility associated with the probability of default. 
This UL will be reflected in the assignment of own funds that constitutes the 
regulatory capital. Capital is needed to cover the risks of such losses, and 
therefore, it has a loss-absorbing function. Interest rates, including credit 
risk premium, charged on credit exposures, should absorb the cost of these 
capital requirements. The cost of the regulatory capital that the loan in 
                                                          
24 Banks can set limits to the risk that they are willing to assume, even if an 
adequate risk premium has been calculated. 
25 A more exact determination of the credit risk premium would involve using the 
concept of economic capital instead of regulatory capital (Martín and Trujillo, 2004 
and Liebig et al. (2007) show that the components of the “minimum margin” are 
the risk-free interest rate, handling charges, the  expected loss of the loan, and 
opportunity costs for the capital allocation associated with the loan. The opportunity 
costs for the capital allocation refer to regulatory capital if the regulatory capital 
requirements are binding. Consequently, credits which are priced below the 
minimum margin are not profitable and will thus not be supplied. 
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question "consumes," is obtained by multiplying this capital requirement or 
CR by any variable representative of the return required from it, for 
example, by the ROE ratio. Therefore, we calculate the credit risk premium 
as follows: 
Credit risk premium (as a percentage) = PD · LGD + ROE · CR     
5.1. Credit risk premiums for SMEs without LGA guarantees 
Based on our previous calculations from Tables 4 to 6, we quantify the 
components that comprise the credit risk premium for SMEs without 
guarantee as shown in Table 7. According to the data from the Spanish 
Association of Banks, the average Return of Equity (ROE) of Spanish banks 
during 2000-2009 was 14.6%26 while the LGD is assumed to be 45%. We 
can observe that at higher rates of insolvency, the banks need a higher CR, 
and the higher rates of interest should be applied to loan operations with 
SMEs. At a similar probability of default, the SME borrowers with lower 
annual sales will benefit more in terms of differential of interest, although it 
should be remembered that, in principle, the lower the annual sales volume 
of the SME, the higher is its probability of bankruptcy, ceteris paribus. In 
this way, banking regulation try to alleviate the burden represented by the 
new capital requirements for companies of small size as much as possible, 
by not excessively increasing the consequent risk premium. 
5.2. Credit risk premiums for SMEs guaranteed by an LGA 
Next, we analyse the impact of the LGA guarantee on the CR 
demanded of banks for loans to SMEs to determine its effect on the credit 
                                                          
26 Asociación Española de Banca [Spanish Association of Banks] (2010). Available 
at: 
http://www.aebanca.es/internet/groups/public/documents/presentaciones/01-
201004064.pdf 
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risk premium previously calculated. It has already been shown how the 
reduction of risk (as a consequence of the existence of the guarantee of the 
LGA) is translated into reduced capital requirements and, ultimately, into 
lower risk premiums (interest rates) chargeable to the SMEs, thus reducing 
the cost of credit for the SMEs. The precise quantification of the new credit 
risk premium will depend on the value taken by the basic variables of the 
risk (mainly the PD and the LGD) for the endorsing LGA. It is almost certain 
that the probability of default of the LGA will be lower than that of the 
borrower SME; hence, the amount of the EL (the first component of the 
credit risk premium) should be considerably reduced. If the possible 
existence of reinsurance is added to this, and since both the SME and its 
endorsing LGA would need to become insolvent for the bank not to recover 
its money, the expected value of any loss would be even lower.  
After quantifying credit risk premiums for SMEs guaranteed by an LGA 
in Table 8, we show that under Basel II the CRP is 0.221% in the best case 
possible (maturity assumed as 3 years and PD of the LGA equals to 
0.03%).27 When the creditworthiness of the LGA worsens the risk premiums 
increase, reaching about 2% in the worst case considered in our study (loan 
maturity assumed as 5 years and PD of the LGA equals to 1%).28 Under the 
new banking rules proposed in Basel III those percentages will be higher: 
0.285% and 2.466%, respectively. 
Next, in Table 9 we present the differences of the estimated credit risk 
premiums for the credits to SMEs guaranteed by an LGA with a PD of 0.03% 
(best-case scenario), against the CRP for loans without LGA guarantee. 
                                                          
27 Basel Accords establish a minimum value of PD (0.03%) under the IRB approach. 
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These differences always favour operations supported by an LGA. A sole 
exception exists for this result: when SMEs are treated as retail, the lowest 
risk class (A) has a lower CRP when the company is not guaranteed by an 
LGA. Note also that those divergences are greater as the SME rating 
decreases and under Basel III standards.  
Finally, in Table 10 we show the differences between the credit risk 
premiums according to the worst-case scenario of those considered (LGA PD 
of 1%). 
5.3. Assessment of the cost of the LGA guarantee 
Having reached this point, the subsequent questions are: What is the 
cost of the guarantee for the SME, and is this cost compensated by the 
reduction of the risk premium previously calculated that, in theory, the bank 
should translate into a lower rate of interest for an operation guaranteed by 
an LGA? 
In guarantee systems of mutual type, like the Spanish one, those SMEs 
that are inclined to obtain a guarantee from an LGA must necessarily 
become partners (i.e. must participate in the ownership). However, once 
the credit has been amortised, the company can request the return of its 
participation. These recoverable contributions (subscription quota or SQ) 
represent an opportunity cost for the SME borrower. In addition, the SMEs 
that request a guarantee from an LGA must do so against a series of non-
recoverable costs, specifically: i) the study commission (SC), charged as a 
percentage on the amount of guarantee requested, which is intended to 
reimburse the LGA for conducting a study of the viability of the project; this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
28 Since the LGA is usually counter-guaranteed by a reinsurance company (in the 
case of Spain, CERSA) is more likely that the PD is closer to 0.03% than 1% (see 
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cost is incurred irrespective of whether the guarantee is finally conceded or 
not. It is paid only once, when the operation is requested; ii) the 
commission in the concept of guarantee (GC), which is usually charged as a 
percentage of the amount due at the beginning of each accounting period; 
this is payable annually by the SME during the term of the guarantee. Its 
objective is to cover the possible insolvency of the partner endorsed and will 
depend on the method of amortisation of the loan granted by the bank. 
To make it feasible to compare these costs with the credit risk 
premiums previously calculated, we must estimate the cost of the 
guarantee as an effective annual amount (IRR). This is given by the 
following equation of n degree: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nn
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IRR
ADGC
IRR
ADGCADGCASCSQA
+
−⋅
+
+
⋅
−−
+
⋅
−⋅−⋅+−=
− 11
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1
0 1
2
1    (4) 
Where A is the amount of the guarantee, SQ the subscription quota to 
the capital of the LGA, SC the study commission, GC the guarantee 
commission, ADt represents the amount due for the loan guaranteed at the 
beginning of year t, and n is the term of the loan (in years). 
In the most usual case of amortisation of a loan with constant annual 
repayments (French system) and for average data of the Spanish market 
for 2009, the result obtained after applying Equation (4) is 0.68%.29  
Therefore, we find that it will be advantageous for an SME to request 
the guarantee to an LGA with the best credit quality provided that (see 
Table 9): 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Section 4.4). 
29 We assume the following data taken from CESGAR (2010): average amount of the 
guarantee (A), 66,000€; study commission (SC), 0.5%; guarantee commission (GC), 1.0%; 
contribution to the capital of the LGA (SQ), 1.0%; rate of interest (i), 6.0%; and average 
term of the loan (n), 8 years. 
 23
i) Corporate category: the SME credit rating is worse than BBB 
(small firms) or BB+ (medium-sized firms), either under Basel II 
or Basel III rules. 
ii) Retail category: the SME credit rating is lower than BB for Basel II 
standards; and below BBB under Basel III proposals. 
 
However, when the credit quality of the LGA worsens its guarantee 
becomes less attractive, being only profitable to those SMEs of poorer credit 
quality when the PD of the LGA equals 1% (see Table 10). 
6. Conclusions 
The application of Basel II and Basel III have important consequences 
for banks, SME borrowers, and LGAs, which are financial intermediaries 
whose importance is increasing and which appear, practically, all over the 
countries in the European Union. For banks, the new banking regulation 
means working in a more stable financial environment. Once the banks 
have learnt how to measure, cover, and appropriately manage the risks to 
which their operations are exposed, they should face fewer situations of 
default; but if these situations do occur, they should be better placed to 
deal with them. For SMEs, the Capital Accords mean the payment of 
premiums according to the risk of their business initiatives. In the past, the 
alternative involved restrictions in their access to credit, arising specifically 
from the difficulty that calibrating that risk presented for the banks. At the 
same time, the SMEs need to be instructed in the management of risk, 
knowing that the lender will assess them in that respect. Finally, in the face 
of the challenge of Basel Accords, the LGAs must accept that, like the SMEs 
they guarantee, they may need to submit themselves to the same 
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processes of measurement of risk as those to which their associates are 
submitted, i.e., at a credit rating. 
The guarantee appears to be strengthened under the new banking 
regulation. Generally, the loans guaranteed by another bank, like an LGA, 
will need backing by reduced amounts of regulatory capital when compared 
with those loans collateralised by assets (financial or not). Consequently, it 
is clear that when the credit to the SME is conceded with the guarantee of 
an LGA, this reduces the capital requirement demanded from the bank, 
although its final effect on the credit risk premium depends on the values 
taken by the credit variables of the LGA (principally the PD and the LGD).  
It is, therefore, necessary for the banks to make a detailed and 
meticulous analysis of the creditworthiness of the LGA, to determine their 
PD. Thus, it follows that in those countries that adopt the new banking 
regulation, it is also necessary for the development of credit agencies to be 
strengthened, for rating both SMEs and their financial intermediary 
guarantors, the LGA. In this context, it also seems clear that the 
reinsurance companies have an important role to play in reinforcing the 
creditworthiness of the LGA; this importance has been recognised by some 
countries like Spain, in the legislation for implementing the new Accords. 
The SMEs endorsed by an LGA, whose guarantees are indirectly counter-
guaranteed to a significant percentage by a reinsurance company, should be 
rewarded with lower capital requirements by the lender, considering that 
this backup guarantee should be taken into account by the bank in the 
calculation of the PD or LGD when the IRB approach is used. 
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Appendix A: 
 
Table A.1: Formulas used in calculations in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
This table shows the formulas used to estimate the capital requirements (CR) for SMEs under 
the IRB approach. BII indicates the formulation under Basel II Accord, whereas BIII states 
for Basel III Accord. Remember that, in Basel III, a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% is 
established above the regulatory minimum capital requirement. 
 
SMEs as retail 
Capital 
requirement 
CR 
( ) ( )0.999( ) 1.06
1
G PD R G
CR BII LGD N PD LGD
R
 + ×
= × − × × 
−  
    (5) 
 
( ) ( ) 0.105 / 0.08CR BIII CR BII= ×                                   (6) 
 
Correlation  
R 35 35
35 35
1 10,03 0,16 1
1 1
PD PDe eR
e e
− ⋅ − ⋅
− −
    − −
= ⋅ + ⋅ −    
− −    
                 (7) 
 
SMEs as corporate 
Capital 
requirement 
CR 
( ) ( ) ( )0.999 1 2.5( ) 1.06
1 1.51
G PD R G M b
CR BII LGD N PD LGD
bR
 + × + − ×
= × − × × 
− ×
−  
    (8) 
 
( ) ( ) 0.105 / 0.08CR BIII CR BII= ×                                    (9) 
 
Correlation  
R 50 50
50 50
1 1 1 ( 5)0,12 0,24 1 0,04
1 1 45
PD PDe e SR
e e
− ⋅ − ⋅
− −
    − − − − 
= ⋅ + ⋅ − − ⋅      
− −      
        (10) 
 
Maturity 
adjustment 
[ ]2)(ln05478,011852,0 PDb ⋅−=  
Where: 
CR: Capital requirement. 
LGD: Loss given default. 
N (x): Standard normal cumulative distribution. 
R: Correlation. 
G (z): Inverse standard normal cumulative distribution. 
PD:  Probability of default. 
M: Maturity of the operation. 
b: Maturity adjustment.  
 
Source: According to Basel II and III Accords.  
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Table A.2: Estimation of rating classes for SMEs as retail 
This table shows the classification of firms into rating classes, considering all the firms in the 
sample. E(PD) is the predicted probability of default obtained through the logit model. These 
values are selected observing the one-year PD distribution of S&P. The second column 
(Cases) shows the number of firms that have a predicted probability of default of less than p 
(p <= 0.64% for the first row, for example); we take this number of firms as the rating class 
size. The third column shows the number of real (observed) defaults contained in the 
number of firms depicted en the Cases column. Observed PD shows the ratio of real defaults 
(2) to number of firms in the rating class (1). The fifth column shows which S&P rating can 
be associated to the Observed PD. 
 
E(PD) < p 
Cases 
(1) 
Observed 
defaults (2) 
Observed PD 
(2/1) 
Rating 
0.64% 933 1 0.107% A 
5.00% 1729 3 0.174% BBB+ 
13.50% 1637 4 0.244% BBB 
25.00% 1336 11 0.823% BB 
46.00% 1724 42 2.436% B+ 
60.00% 793 47 5.927% B 
100.00% 1331 381 28.625% CCC  
           Source: Authors’ calculations on data from SABI and S&P (for rating classes). 
 
Table A.3: Estimation of rating classes for SMEs as corporate (Sales 
< €25m) 
This table shows the classification of firms into rating classes, considering those firms with 
annual sales below €25 million. E(PD) is the predicted probability of default obtained through 
the logit model. These values are selected observing the one-year PD distribution of S&P. 
The second column (Cases) shows the number of firms that have a predicted probability of 
default of less than p (p <= 0.64% for the first row, for example); we take this number of 
firms as the rating class size. The third column shows the number of real (observed) defaults 
contained in the number of firms depicted en the Cases column. Observed PD shows the 
ratio of real defaults (2) to number of firms in the rating class (1). The fifth column shows 
which S&P rating can be associated to the Observed PD. 
 
E(PD) < p 
Cases 
(1) 
Observed 
defaults (2) 
Observed PD 
(2/1) 
Rating 
0.64% 793 1 0.13% A 
3.50% 1112 2 0.18% BBB+ 
19.00% 2341 6 0.26% BBB 
26.00% 629 7 1.11% BB+ 
40.00% 1044 19 1.82% BB 
58.00% 914 43 4.70% BB- 
100% 1213 345 28.44% CCC 
        Source: Authors’ calculations on data from SABI and S&P (for rating classes). 
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Table A.4: Estimation of rating classes for SMEs as corporate (Sales 
€25-50 m) 
This table shows the classification of firms into rating classes, considering those firms with 
annual sales between €25 and 50 million. E(PD) is the predicted probability of default 
obtained through the logit model. These values are selected observing the one-year PD 
distribution of S&P. The second column (Cases) shows the number of firms that have a 
predicted probability of default of less than p (p <= 0.64% for the first row, for example); 
we take this number of firms as the rating class size. The third column shows the number of 
real (observed) defaults contained in the number of firms depicted en the Cases column. 
Observed PD shows the ratio of real defaults (2) to number of firms in the rating class (1). 
The fifth column  shows which S&P rating can be associated to the Observed PD. 
 
E(PD) < p 
Cases 
(1) 
Observed 
defaults (2) 
Observed PD 
(2/1) 
Rating 
10.00% 546 1 0.183% BBB+ 
13.30% 96 1 1.042% BB 
19.00% 143 2 1.399% BB- 
37.50% 257 6 2.335% B+ 
70.00% 297 21 7.071% B 
100.00% 133 35 26.316% CCC 
     Source: Authors’ calculations on data from SABI and S&P (for rating classes). 
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Sample distribution (Sales €5-50 m.) 
This table shows the sample distribution of defaulted and active firms per year, is the One-
year PD for years 2005- 2007 (normal years). The one-year PD for years 2008 and 2009 is 
calculated adjusting the “normal years” PD by the annual variation shown in the last column 
in Table 1. The third column shows the number of defaulted firms (with sales between €5 to 
50 m.) found in SABI database. Active firms are those that have not defaulted since the 
corresponding year up to 2010. The number of active firms was selected to obtain a ratio of 
defaulted to total firms equal to the prior one-year PD. 
 
Year of 
default 
One-year PD 
Defaulted 
firms (1) 
Active firms 
(2) 
TOTAL 
(1+2) 
2005 3.07% 9 284 293 
2006 3.07% 10 316 326 
2007 3.07% 88 2,779 2,867 
2008 5.47% 186 3,215 3,401 
2009 7.55% 196 2,400 2,596 
TOTAL - 489 8,994 9,483 
Source: Authors’ calculations on data from INE and SABI. 
 
 
Table 2: Explanatory variables 
This table describes the list of potential variables used in the logit estimations, sorted by 
ratio category. 
 
Explanatory variables Category 
Natural log of total assets (LNA) 
Size 
Firm age (Age) 
Added Value/ Total assets (AVTA) 
Profitability – 
Perfomance 
ROA (EBIT/ Total assets) 
ROE 
Ordinary profits / Sales  (OPS) 
Extra-ordinary profits / Ordinary profits (EPOP) 
EBITDA / Total debt  (EBITDATD) 
Financial charges / Sales (FCS) 
(Financial profits – Financial charges)/ Total debt (FRTD) 
Financial charges / Total debt (FCTD) 
Cash/ Total assets  (CTA) 
Liquidity 
Cash Flow/ Short term debt 
Cash Flow/ Total assets (CFTA) 
Current  assets / Short term debt (CASTD) 
Cash/ Short term debt (CSTD) 
Long term debt / Total assets (LTDTA) 
Leverage Total debt/Equity 
Total debt/Total assets (TDTA) 
Tangible assets / Total assets (TanTA) 
Activity 
Accounts payable / Total assets (APTA) 
Sales / Total assets (SalesTA) 
Sales / Current assets (SCA) 
Sales growth (Sgrowth) 
Growth 
Assets growth (TAgrowth) 
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Table 3: Selected variables and their observed effect on probability 
of default. 
This table shows the list of selected variables for the final logit model, the observed sign and 
level of statistical significance, and the ratio category of each variable. 
 
Variable Observed sign Ratio category 
Total debt / Total assets  
(TDTA) 
3.987*** Leverage 
ROA - 7.457*** 
Profitability - Perfomance (Financial profits – Financial 
charges)/ Total debt (FRTD) 
-21.929*** 
Sales / Total assets (Sales/TA) -0.183*** 
Activity Tangible assets / Total assets 
(TanTA) 
-2.508*** 
Cash Flow/ Total assets 
(CFTA) 
-6.706*** Liquidity 
Asset growth (TA Growth) 0.218** Growth 
Firm age (Age) -0.028*** Size 
Year 2008 (y2008) (Dummy 
variable) 
0.839*** 
Time dummy 
 Year 2009 (y2009) (Dummy 
variable) 
0.513* 
FRTD * y2009 10.845** 
Interaction term 
TanTA * y2009 2.606*** 
N defaulted (N not defaulted): 489 (8994) 
Log pseudo-likelihood: -3585.5698                  
Wald statistic: 294.55*** 
Pseudo-R2: 0.4545 
*     Statistical significance level at the 10%. 
**    Statistical significance level at the 5%. 
***  Statistical significance level at the 1%. 
 
 
Table 4: Capital requirements for SMEs considered as retail 
This table shows the capital requirements, in percentage, for a loan to an SME included in 
the retail category. PD is the probability of default, LGD (loss given default) is assumed as 
45%; CR is the capital requirement or regulatory capital, as a percentage of the EAD, 
calculated according to equation (4) in Table A.1 for Basel II, and according to equation (6) 
for Basel III. In the third column, the weights are assigned using the percent of firms in each 
rating class. In the Cum. weight column, the product of the capital requirement (CR) and the 
weight is cumulated to obtain the total capital requirement. In the last two columns we show 
the distribution of total firms (Cases) and defaulted firms (Default) for each class. 
 
   Basel II Basel III   
Rating PD Weight CR 
Cum. 
weight 
CR 
Cum. 
weight 
Cases Default 
A 0.107% 0.0984 0.0100 0.098% 0.0131 0.129% 933 1 
BBB+ 0.174% 0.1823 0.0140 0.354% 0.0184 0.464% 1,729 3 
BBB 0.244% 0.1726 0.0177 0.659% 0.0232 0.865% 1,637 4 
BB 0.823% 0.1409 0.0356 1.160% 0.0467 1.522% 1,336 11 
B+ 2.436% 0.1818 0.0514 2.094% 0.0674 2.748% 1,724 42 
B 5.927% 0.0836 0.0573 2.573% 0.0753 3.378% 793 47 
CCC  28.625% 0.1404 0.0963 3.926% 0.1264 5.152% 1,331 381 
Average 5.157%     Total 9,483 489 
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Table 5: Capital requirements for SMEs considered as corporate 
(Sales below €25 m) 
This table shows the capital requirements, in percentage, for a loan to an SME in the 
corporate category, with average annual sales of €12.1 million. PD is the probability of 
default, LGD (loss given default) is assumed as 45%; the maturity of the operation is 
assumed to be 3 years; CR is the capital requirement or regulatory capital, as a percentage 
of the EAD, calculated according to equation (8) in Table A.1 for Basel II, and according to 
equation (9) for Basel III. In the third column, the weights are assigned using the percent of 
firms in each rating class. In the Cum. weight column, the product of the capital requirement 
(CR) and the weight is cumulated to obtain the total capital requirement. In the last two 
columns we show the distribution of total firms (Cases) and defaulted firms (Default) for 
each class. 
 
 
   Basel II Basel III   
Rating PD Weight CR 
Cum. 
weight 
CR 
Cum. 
weight 
Cases Default 
A 0.126% 0.0986 0.02477 0.244% 0.0325 0.320% 793 1 
BBB+ 0.180% 0.1382 0.03003 0.659% 0.0394 0.865% 1,112 2 
BBB 0.256% 0.2910 0.03613 1.710% 0.0474 2.245% 2,341 6 
BB+ 1.113% 0.0782 0.06734 2.237% 0.0884 2.936% 629 7 
BB 1.820% 0.1298 0.07749 3.242% 0.1017 4.256% 1,044 19 
BB- 4.705% 0.1136 0.09890 4.366% 0.1298 5.730% 914 43 
CCC  28.442% 0.1508 0.17832 7.054% 0.2340 9.259% 1,213 345 
Average 5.257%     Total 8,046 423 
 
 
Table 6: Capital requirements for SMEs considered as corporate 
(Sales between €25-50m) 
This table shows the capital requirements, in percentage, for a loan to an SME in the 
corporate category, with average annual sales of €33.4 million. PD is the probability of 
default, LGD (loss given default) is assumed as 45%; the maturity of the operation is 
assumed to be 5 years; CR is the capital requirement or regulatory capital, as a percentage 
of the EAD, calculated according to equation (8) in Table A.1 for Basel II, and according to 
equation (9) for Basel III. In the third column, the weights are assigned using the percent of 
firms in each rating class. In the Cum. weight column, the product of the capital requirement 
(CR) and the weight is cumulated to obtain the total capital requirement. In the last two 
columns we show the distribution of total firms (Cases) and defaulted firms (Default) for 
each class. 
 
   Basel II Basel III   
Rating PD Weight CR 
Cum 
weight 
CR 
Cum 
weight 
Cases Default 
BBB+ 0.183% 0.3800 0.04021 1.528% 0.0528 2.005% 546 1 
BB 1.042% 0.0668 0.07885 2.055% 0.1035 2.697% 96 1 
BB- 1.852% 0.0752 0.09198 2.746% 0.1207 3.604% 108 2 
B+ 2.335% 0.1788 0.09715 4.483% 0.1275 5.884% 257 6 
B 7.071% 0.2067 0.13327 7.238% 0.1749 9.500% 297 21 
CCC 26.316% 0.0926 0.19717 9.063% 0.2588 11.895% 133 35 
Average 4.593%     Total 1,437 66 
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Table 7: Credit risk premiums for SMEs, as a percentage of the EAD.  
This table shows the credit risk premium for SMEs for the IRB approach. PD is the probability 
of default from Tables 4 to 6; LGD (loss given default) is assumed as 45%; EL denotes the 
expected loss as a percentage of the exposure to the risk, which is estimated as the product 
of both the probability of default or PD and the loss given default or LGD; ROE is the average 
return on equity for Spanish banks during the period 2000-2009; CR is the capital 
requirement or regulatory capital, as a percentage of the EAD (data from Tables 4 to 6); ROE 
x CR refers to the opportunity cost of the regulatory capital; and Credit Risk Premium (CRP) 
is the sum of two components: the expected loss (EL) and the opportunity cost of the 
regulatory capital (ROE x CR). 
 
SME treated as Corporate 
a) Firms with average sales of € 12.1 m. (small firms) 
   Basel II Basel III 
Rating PD EL CR ROE x CR CRP CR ROE x CR CRP 
A 0.126% 0.057% 2.477% 0.362% 0.418% 3.251% 0.475% 0.531% 
BBB+ 0.180% 0.081% 3.003% 0.439% 0.519% 3.942% 0.576% 0.656% 
BBB 0.256% 0.115% 3.613% 0.527% 0.643% 4.742% 0.692% 0.808% 
BB+ 1.113% 0.501% 6.734% 0.983% 1.484% 8.838% 1.290% 1.791% 
BB 1.820% 0.819% 7.749% 1.131% 1.950% 10.171% 1.485% 2.304% 
BB- 4.705% 2.117% 9.890% 1.444% 3.561% 12.981% 1.895% 4.012% 
CCC  28.442% 12.799% 17.832% 2.603% 15.402% 23.404% 3.417% 16.216% 
b) Firms with average sales of € 33.4 m. (medium firms) 
   Basel II Basel III 
Rating PD EL CR ROE x CR CRP CR ROE x CR CRP 
BBB+ 0.183% 0.082% 4.021% 0.587% 0.670% 5.278% 0.771% 0.853% 
BB 1.042% 0.469% 7.885% 1.151% 1.620% 10.348% 1.511% 1.980% 
BB- 1.852% 0.833% 9.198% 1.343% 2.176% 12.072% 1.762% 2.596% 
B+ 2.335% 1.051% 9.715% 1.418% 2.469% 12.750% 1.862% 2.912% 
B 7.071% 3.182% 13.327% 1.946% 5.128% 17.492% 2.554% 5.736% 
CCC 26.316% 11.842% 19.717% 2.879% 14.721% 25.879% 3.778% 15.620% 
SME treated as Retail 
   Basel II Basel III 
Rating PD EL CR ROE x CR CRP CR ROE x CR CRP 
A 0.107% 0.048% 0.996% 0.145% 0.194% 1.307% 0.191% 0.239% 
BBB+ 0.174% 0.078% 1.402% 0.205% 0.283% 1.840% 0.269% 0.347% 
BBB 0.244% 0.110% 1.767% 0.258% 0.368% 2.319% 0.339% 0.449% 
BB 0.823% 0.371% 3.556% 0.519% 0.890% 4.668% 0.681% 1.052% 
B+ 2.436% 1.096% 5.138% 0.750% 1.846% 6.744% 0.985% 2.081% 
B 5.927% 2.667% 5.735% 0.837% 3.504% 7.527% 1.099% 3.766% 
CCC  28.625% 12.881% 9.634% 1.407% 14.288% 12.645% 1.846% 14.727% 
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Table 8: Credit risk premiums for SMEs guaranteed by an LGA. 
This table shows the credit risk premium for SMEs guaranteed by an LGA under the IRB 
approach, as a percentage of the EAD. PDLGA is the probability of default of the LGA. EL 
denotes the expected loss as a percentage of the exposure to the risk, which is estimated as 
the product of both the probability of default or PD and the loss given default or LGD 
(assumed as 45%); ROE is the average return on equity for Spanish banks during the period 
2000-2009 (assumed as 14.6%). CR is the capital requirement or regulatory capital, as a 
percentage of the EAD, calculated according to equation (8) in Table A.1 (the maturity of the 
operation is assumed to be 3 years).  Under Basel III, CR is calculated according to equation 
(9) in Table A.1 (the maturity of the operation is assumed to be 3 years).  ROE x CR refers 
to the opportunity cost of the regulatory capital; and Credit Risk Premium (CRP) is the sum 
of two components: the expected loss (EL) and the opportunity cost of the regulatory capital 
(ROE x CR).  
 
Maturity= 3 years 
  Basel II Basel III 
PDLGA EL CR ROE x CR CRP CR ROE x CR CRP 
0.030% 0.014% 1.419% 0.207% 0.221% 1.862% 0.272% 0.285% 
0.250% 0.113% 4.614% 0.674% 0.786% 6.056% 0.884% 0.997% 
0.500% 0.225% 6.396% 0.934% 1.159% 8.395% 1.226% 1.451% 
0.750% 0.338% 7.544% 1.101% 1.439% 9.902% 1.446% 1.783% 
1.000% 0.450% 8.367% 1.222% 1.672% 10.981% 1.603% 2.053% 
Maturity= 5 years 
  Basel II Basel III 
PDLGA EL CR ROE x CR CRP CR ROE x CR CRP 
0.030% 0.014% 2.195% 0.320% 0.334% 2.881% 0.421% 0.434% 
0.250% 0.113% 6.288% 0.918% 1.031% 8,253% 1.205% 1.317% 
0.500% 0.225% 8.369% 1.222% 1.447% 10.984% 1.604% 1.829% 
0.750% 0.338% 9.642% 1.408% 1.745% 12.655% 1.848% 2.185% 
1.000% 0.450% 10.519% 1.536% 1.986% 13.806% 2.016% 2.466% 
 
 
  
 
Table 9: Differences of credit risk premiums for Spanish SMEs 
guaranteed by an LGA (with a PD of 0.03%) versus SMEs without 
LGA guarantees. 
This table shows the differences in credit risk premium between SMEs that are guaranteed by 
an LGA (with a PD of 0.03%) and SMEs that are not, as a percentage of the EAD. PDSME is 
the probability of default extracted from Tables 4 to 6; CRPSME shows the CRP for a SME 
without LGA guarantee (data from Table 7).PDLGA is the probability of default of the LGA. 
CRPLGA shows the CRP for a SME with LGA guarantee (data from Table 8). 
 
SME treated as Corporate 
a) Firms with average sales of € 12.1 m. (small firms, maturity=3 years) 
  Basel II – PDLGA 0.03% Basel III – PDLGA 0.03% 
Rating PDSME 
CRP SME 
(a) 
CRP LGA 
(b) 
Difference CRP 
(1=b-a) 
CRP SME 
(c) 
CRP LGA (d) 
Difference CRP 
(2=d-c) 
A 0.126% 0.418% 0.221% -0.198% 0.531% 0.285% -0.246% 
BBB+ 0.180% 0.519% 0.221% -0.299% 0.656% 0.285% -0.371% 
BBB 0.256% 0.643% 0.221% -0.422% 0.808% 0.285% -0.522% 
BB+ 1.113% 1.484% 0.221% -1.263% 1.791% 0.285% -1.506% 
BB 1.820% 1.950% 0.221% -1.730% 2.304% 0.285% -2.019% 
BB- 4.705% 3.561% 0.221% -3.340% 4.012% 0.285% -3.727% 
CCC 28.442% 15.402% 0.221% -15.182% 16.216% 0.285% -15.930% 
b) Firms with average sales of € 33.4 m. (medium firms, maturity = 5 years) 
  Basel II – PDLGA 0.03% Basel III – PDLGA 0.03% 
Rating PDSME 
CRP SME 
(a) 
CRP LGA 
(b) 
Difference CRP 
(1=b-a) 
CRP SME 
(c) 
CRP LGA (d) 
Difference CRP 
(2=d-c) 
BBB+ 0.183% 0.670% 0.334% -0.336% 0.853% 0.434% -0.419% 
BB 1.042% 1.620% 0.334% -1.286% 1.980% 0.434% -1.546% 
BB- 1.852% 2.176% 0.334% -1.842% 2.596% 0.434% -2.162% 
B+ 2.335% 2.469% 0.334% -2.135% 2.912% 0.434% -2.478% 
B 7.071% 5.128% 0.334% -4.794% 5.736% 0.434% -5.302% 
CCC 26.316% 14.721% 0.334% -14.387% 15.620% 0.434% -15.186% 
SME treated as Retail (maturity for guaranteed loans=3 years) 
  Basel II – PDLGA 0.03% Basel III – PDLGA 0.03% 
Rating PDSME 
CRP SME 
(a) 
CRP LGA 
(b) 
Difference CRP 
(1=b-a) 
CRP SME 
(c) 
CRP LGA (d) 
Difference CRP 
(2=d-c) 
A 0.107% 0.194% 0.221% 0.027% 0.239% 0.285% 0.046% 
BBB+ 0.174% 0.283% 0.221% -0.062% 0.347% 0.285% -0.061% 
BBB 0.244% 0.368% 0.221% -0.147% 0.449% 0.285% -0.163% 
BB 0.823% 0.890% 0.221% -0.669% 1.052% 0.285% -0.767% 
B+ 2.436% 1.846% 0.221% -1.626% 2.081% 0.285% -1.796% 
B 5.927% 3.504% 0.221% -3.284% 3.766% 0.285% -3.481% 
CCC 28.625% 14.288% 0.221% -14.067% 14.727% 0.285% -14.442% 
 
 
Table 10: Differences of credit risk premiums for Spanish SMEs 
guaranteed by an LGA (with a PD of 1%) versus SMEs without LGA 
guarantees. 
This table shows the differences in credit risk premium between SMEs that are guaranteed by 
an LGA (with a PD of 1%) and SMEs that are not, as a percentage of the EAD. PDSME is the 
probability of default extracted from Tables 4 to 6; CRPSME shows the CRP for a SME without 
LGA guarantee (data from Table 7).PDLGA is the probability of default of the LGA. CRPLGA 
shows the CRP for a SME with LGA guarantee (data from Table 8). 
 
SME treated as Corporate 
a) Firms with average sales of € 12.1 m. (small firms, maturity=3 years) 
  Basel II – PDLGA 0.03% Basel III – PDLGA 0.03% 
  
 
Rating PDSME 
CRP SME 
(a) 
CRP LGA 
(b) 
Difference CRP 
(1=b-a) 
CRP SME 
(c) 
CRP LGA (d) 
Difference CRP 
(2=d-c) 
A 0.126% 0.418% 1.672% 1.254% 0.531% 2.053% 1.522% 
BBB+ 0.180% 0.519% 1.672% 1.153% 0.656% 2.053% 1.397% 
BBB 0.256% 0.643% 1.672% 1.029% 0.808% 2.053% 1.245% 
BB+ 1.113% 1.484% 1.672% 0.188% 1.791% 2.053% 0.262% 
BB 1.820% 1.950% 1.672% -0.278% 2.304% 2.053% -0.251% 
BB- 4.705% 3.561% 1.672% -1.889% 4.012% 2.053% -1.959% 
CCC 28.442% 15.402% 1.672% -13.730% 16.216% 2.053% -14.163% 
b) Firms with average sales of € 33.4 m. (medium firms, maturity = 5 years) 
  Basel II – PDLGA 0.03% Basel III – PDLGA 0.03% 
Rating PDSME 
CRP SME 
(a) 
CRP LGA 
(b) 
Difference CRP 
(1=b-a) 
CRP SME 
(c) 
CRP LGA (d) 
Difference CRP 
(2=d-c) 
BBB+ 0.183% 0.670% 1.986% 1.316% 0.853% 2.466% 1.613% 
BB 1.042% 1.620% 1.986% 0.366% 1.980% 2.466% 0.486% 
BB- 1.852% 2.176% 1.986% -0.190% 2.596% 2.466% -0.130% 
B+ 2.335% 2.469% 1.986% -0.483% 2.912% 2.466% -0.446% 
B 7.071% 5.128% 1.986% -3.142% 5.736% 2.466% -3.270% 
CCC 26.316% 14.721% 1.986% -12.735% 15.620% 2.466% -13.154% 
SME treated as Retail (maturity for guaranteed loans=3 years) 
  Basel II – PDLGA 0.03% Basel III – PDLGA 0.03% 
Rating PDSME 
CRP SME 
(a) 
CRP LGA 
(b) 
Difference CRP 
(1=b-a) 
CRP SME 
(c) 
CRP LGA (d) 
Difference CRP 
(2=d-c) 
A 0.107% 0.194% 1.672% 1.478% 0.239% 2.053% 1.814% 
BBB+ 0.174% 0.283% 1.672% 1.389% 0.347% 2.053% 1.706% 
BBB 0.244% 0.368% 1.672% 1.304% 0.449% 2.053% 1.604% 
BB 0.823% 0.890% 1.672% 0.782% 1.052% 2.053% 1.001% 
B+ 2.436% 1.846% 1.672% -0.174% 2.081% 2.053% -0.028% 
B 5.927% 3.504% 1.672% -1.832% 3.766% 2.053% -1.713% 
CCC 28.625% 14.288% 1.672% -12.616% 14.727% 2.053% -12.674% 
 
 
 
 
